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Abstract 
Considering intrinsic valuation of software developers as the main motive for participating in open source projects, we 
examine the (Nash) equilibrium effort levels of the software developers in implementing projects that follow one of the 
three different technologies: the summation, the weakest-link, and the best-shot. Under the summation technology, 
developers having higher intrinsic valuation exert more effort in open source projects but all developers in commercial 
projects expend the same effort. Under the weakest-link technology, regardless of the types of the projects, all 
developers exert the same effort at equilibrium. In open source projects, the developer with the lowest intrinsic 
valuation has a crucial role in determining the equilibrium effort level while, in case of commercial projects, the 
equilibrium effort level is bounded by the net wage. Finally, under the best-shot technology, only one developer makes 
serious effort and the others free ride in both open source and commercial projects.
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     1 Introduction
The phenomenal growth of open source software market has brought attention to the eco-
nomics of open source software. Understanding issues around open source software (OSS)
becomes important to both academics and practitioners. Especially, identifying motiva-
tions for software developers' participation in OSS projects has been exclusively studied
by researchers from dierent elds including economics, information systems, management
and psychology. Shah (2006) summarizes various motivations for OSS participation in the
literature, including free software ideology (Stallman 2001), software users' desire to meet
their own needs (Franke and von Hippel 2003, Lakhani and von Hippel 2003), career concerns
(Learner and Tirole 2002), reputation within the community(Raymond 1999) and enjoyment
(Ghosh 1998). A major implication from the aforementioned studies is that participation in
OSS projects is driven by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations unlike commercial software
projects which are fueled by extrinsic motivations only.
The literature on intrinsic motivation of economic agents is growing in economics. Besley
and Ghatak (2005) study job seeking behavior of motivated agents with dierent intrinsic
benets. Benabou and Tirole (2003) examine the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic
motivations of an agent in a setting where an informed principal selects a policy (extrinsic in-
centives) which reveals information about the agent's ability or his task (intrinsic incentives).
Benabou and Tirole (2006) consider the three components of an agent's motivation: altru-
istic motivation, material self-interest, and self-image concerns. Lerner and Tirole (2002)
argue that the motivations for OSS project participation can be explained by the existing
economic theory.
With a motivation to understand the economics of OSS, we examine two issues: (1)
impact of intrinsic valuation on software developers' project choice between commercial soft-
ware and OSS and (2) software developers' optimal eort levels in dierent types of software
projects with dierent technologies. Grounded in a principle-agent theory, we rst investi-
gate the project choice behavior of software developers and characterize the conditions for
each project to be selected. Then, we analyze the optimal levels of eorts that the developers
in each project exert to make the project successful. We consider three dierent technologies
following Hirshleifer (1983): (1) summation technology, (2) weakest-link technology, and (3)
best-shot technology.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and examines the
project choice behavior of individual software developers. Section 3 analyzes the optimal
levels of eorts in dierent types of projects with dierent technologies. Concluding remarks
are provided in Section 4.
12 Endogenous Project Choice of Individual Developers
We consider the individual developers' choice between commercial and OSS projects. Par-
ticipation in OSS projects is driven by developers' intrinsic motivation, which is inherent
satisfaction for contributing to success of the project. That is, the developers in OSS projects
get intrinsic benets in case of the success of the projects. Instead, the developers in com-
mercial software projects have extrinsic motivation such as external rewards (i.e., monetary
incentives) in return for their eorts. Economists call the workers pursuing intrinsic benets
such as OSS developers motivated agents.
We assume that each developer's intrinsic valuation  is uniformly distributed across
the population of developers on an interval [0;1]. The success of a project depends on the
developer's unobservable eort. If the developer chooses his eort level e 2 [0;1], he incurs
cost c(e) = 1
2e2 and the project succeeds with probability p(e) = e. We assume that all the
developers are risk-neutral and the reservation utility of them is 0.
Now we consider the individual developer's decision problem on which project to partic-
ipate in between an OSS project and a commercial software project. First, consider the case
of participating in the OSS project. If a developer with intrinsic valuation i participates in
the OSS project, he chooses the optimal eort level ei which maximizes his expected utility






 in the superscript denotes the optimum in OSS project. Solving the maximization
problem leads to the optimal eort level and expected payo from the OSS project as follows:
e
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Next, consider the commercial software project. In this case, the developer exerts his ef-
fort for external rewards oered by the software company. The company designs an incentive
scheme w = (ws;wf) that is contingent on success and failure of the commercial software
project in order to induce the developer's eort. If the project succeeds, the company pays
the developer the wage ws. Otherwise, the company pays him the wage wf. We assume that
the individual developer has limited liability, that is, he cannot be paid a negative wage in
any case. Let  be the benet of the company when the project succeeds. The company
gets nothing in case of the failure of the project. Then, the company solves the optimal
contracting problem under moral hazard as follows:
max
fws;wfg
UC = ei(   ws)   (1   ei)wf
subject to:
2 The limited-liability constraint: ws  0, wf  0;
 The participation constraint:






 The incentive-compatibility constraint, which stipulates that the developer's eort level
maximizes his expected payo given an incentive scheme w = (ws;wf):
ei = arg max
ei2[0;1]






The incentive-compatibility constraint can be simplied to ei(ws;wf) = ws   wf.  in
the superscript denotes the optimum in commercial software project. Substituting ei(ws;wf)
into the expected payo of the commercial company and solving its optimal contracting









Given the optimal wage levels w
s and w
f , we obtain the equilibrium eort level and













Comparing the expected payos of the developers in the OSS project (U
i ) and the
commercial software project (U
i ) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The individual developer with low intrinsic motivation (i 2 [0; 1
2)) par-
ticipates in the commercial project. The individual developer with high intrinsic valuation
(i 2 [1
2;1]) chooses the OSS project.
Proposition 1 indicates that the population of developers on an interval [0;1] is di-
chotomized by the critical value of intrinsic benet from the OSS project, 1
2. This implies
that an individual developer makes his project choice by comparing his intrinsic valuation
(i) with his monetary incentive (1
2). Hence, the number of developers participating in the
commercial project increases as the extrinsic benet () increases.
3 Optimal Eort Level with Dierent Technologies
The success of software projects depends on the eort of individual developers. In this
section, we investigate how much eort an individual developer, who belongs to either the
3commercial project or the OSS project, exerts to make the project successful. The eort
level of each individual will depend on his own intrinsic and extrinsic benets, costs, the
eorts exerted by the other developers in his group, and the technology that transforms the
eorts of the group into outcomes. We examine the eort levels of the individual developers
in each project under the following three dierent technologies used in Hirshleifer (1983):
 The summation technology: The success of the project depends on the sum of the
eorts exerted by the individual developers.
 The weakest-link technology: The success of the project depends on the minimum
eort exerted by the individual developers.
 The best-shot technology: The success of the project depends on the maximum
eort exerted by the individual developers.
Varian (2002) distinguishes these three prototypical cases in the context of software
development. Focusing on computer system reliability and security, he examines the optimal
eort levels of individual developers and free riding problem in each case. In this section,
we study how dierent technology (i.e., summation, weakest-link and best-shot) aects the
optimal eort levels of individual developers in dierent projects (i.e., commercial and OSS).
Let m and n be the numbers of developers who are participating in an OSS project and
a commercial project, respectively. An individual developer i in the OSS project has his
own intrinsic valuation i. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1  2  :::  m.
Let ei represent the eort level expended by the individual developer i in each group, and
let p(e1;e2;:::;em(n)) be the probability of success of the project. We assume that the
probability function p() is twice-dierentiable, increasing, and concave, i.e. p0 > 0 and
p00 < 0.
3.1 The Summation Technology
The probability function can be dened as p(
Pm(n)
j=1 ej). We rst consider the OSS developers'
optimal eort levels. Let Ui be the expected payo of developer i. Then developer i chooses













By getting the best response of developer i from the rst-order condition for maximizing














which implies that the developer with higher intrinsic valuation for the project exerts more
eort in the equilibrium.
Now we investigate how much eort developer i exerts in the commercial project. Given
monetary incentive scheme (ws;wf) and the eort levels of the other developers in his group,
































The result implies that all the individual developers in the commercial project exert the
same eort level in the equilibrium unlike the OSS project where the developers' optimal
eort levels vary according to their intrinsic valuation.
3.2 The Weakest-Link Technology





We examine the OSS project rst. Given the eort levels of the other developers in his
group, developer i maximizes his expected payo






with respect to ei.
Considering the characteristics of min function, we can see that each developer will match
his eort level to the minimum eort level of the other developers if his eort is greater than
the minimum of the other developers. From this intuition, we obtain the following best
response of developer i in the OSS project:
e
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where e i = (e1;:::;ei 1;ei+1;:::;em) and eb
i = feijp0(ei)i = eig. From the best responses








5where e 2 [0;eb
m]. That is, there exist multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Among these
equilibria, the equilibrium (eb
m;:::;eb
m) is the Pareto dominant equilibrium. Note that eb
m
is the eort level which maximizes the expected payo of developer m who has the lowest
intrinsic valuation in the group. That is, the lowest-intrinsic-valuation developer has a crucial
role in determining the equilibrium in the OSS project.
Now we consider how much eort an individual developer in the commercial project
exerts. Given (ws;wf) and the eort levels of the other developers, developer i chooses ei
that maximizes his expected payo






Since all the developers in the commercial project face the same monetary incentive






n ) = (e
;:::;e
);
where e 2 [0;  e] and  e = fejp0(e)(ws   wf) = eg. Similar to the OSS case, there exist
multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria, among which ( e;:::;  e) is the Pareto dominant equi-
librium.
3.3 The Best-Shot Technology




). We rst ex-
amine the OSS developers' optimal eort levels. Developer i seeks to maximize his expected
payo






with respect to ei.
Under this best-shot technology, only one developer exerts all the eort and the others
free ride on him in equilibrium. From this intuition, we can also know that there may
exist the multiple Nash equilibria of the game and the number of the equilibria depends
on the intrinsic valuation of the developers. For instance, at one of the equilibria, only
the developer with i-th highest-intrinsic valuation exerts eort and the others do nothing.
Hence, at maximum, there could be m number of Nash equilibria in the game. Among them,







where e = fejp0(e)1 = eg. Note that e is the eort level which maximizes the expected
payo of developer 1 who has the highest intrinsic valuation in the group. That is, at this
6equilibrium, only the developer with the highest intrinsic motivation in the OSS project,
expends his eort while others do not make any contribution.
Now we examine the commercial project case. Given the monetary incentive scheme
(ws;wf) and the eort levels of the other developers, developer i maximizes his expected
payo






with respect to ei.
In the commercial project case, there exist n number of Nash equilibria at which only one






n ) = (e
;0;0;:::;0;0);
where e = fejp0(e)(ws   wf) = eg.
4 Conclusion
We examine two issues surrounding open source software from an economic perspective:
(1) impact of intrinsic valuation on software developers' project choice between commercial
software and OSS and (2) software developers' optimal eort levels in dierent types of
software projects with dierent technologies. We nd that the intrinsic motivation leads
to participation in the OSS project. With summation technology, developers with higher
intrinsic valuation exert more eort in the OSS project while all developers make the same
eort in the commercial project. In the weakest-link case, there exist multiple Nash equilibria
where all developers exert the same level of eort in both OSS and commercial projects. At
the Pareto dominant equilibrium, the optimal eort level is bounded by the eort level of
the developer with lowest intrinsic valuation in the OSS project while the net wage plays a
signicant role in the commercial project. In the best-shot technology, there exist multiple
equilbria at which only one developer makes eort while the others free ride regardless of
project type. Our ndings give managerial implications to software companies and developers
who face their choice problems between commercial and OSS projects.
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